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This paper analyzes the technique of comparative dynamics (Judd, 1982) for the computati-
on of the impact of perturbations on a steady state in a perfect-foresight model. The
accuracy of this technique is demonstrated by numerical simulation ezperiments. More-
over, the technique is generalized to discrete-time models.
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' We would like to thank Lans Bovenberg and Arjan Lejour for comments on an eazlier version. All
remaining errors are ours.l . Introduction
Dynamic perfect-foresight models form the core of modern macrocconomic literature'. Due to technical
difficultics, the an~Jysis of this kind of modcls is often res[ricted to comparative statics and a graphical
illustratiun of thc saddlepath dynamícs. A major drawback of this practicc is thal it is difficult to fully scc
through the conseyuences of perturbations of [he steady state, especially when [hese perturbations are non-
stationary. Therefore, sometimes the dynamics of the model are illustrated by numerical simulation
experiments. Simulation, however, has the disadvantage that it is difficult to judge to what extent the
outcomes depend on the specific parameter configuration used in the ezperiments.But there is a third way to
analyze the dynamics of perfect-foresight models in continuous time. This is the method of comparative
dynamics as presented by Judd (1982), which generates an analytically tractable approximation of the real
solution. It is an elegant generalization of linear approzimations as, for instance, employed in [he method of
comparative sta[ics. In contrast to comparative statics, which is widely accepted as a basic tool for
economists, the method of compazative dynamics seldom penetrates into the economic journalsz. There may
be three reasons for this. Firstly, many economists may feel ill at ease when highly non-linear dynamical
relations are approximated by a simple Iinearization just as, admittedly, we did initially. Secondly, a large
number of modcls are fonnulatcd in discrete time instead of continuous time so that Judd's method cannot
always be readily applied. Finally, compara[ive dynamics may just have escaped the notice of a number of
economists. The latter reason obviously is a poor excuse for not using comparative dynamics. The aim of
this paper is to show that the (ormer two are not a good excuse either.
2. Thc method of comparative dynamics in discrete time




where x is a vector of non-predetermined variables (also known as jump or forward-looking variables),
while y denotes the predetermined (or backward-looking) variables, and p is a vector of parameters or
exogenous variables. The system ís assumed to be ini[ially in a s[a[ionary state (xy7 de[ermined by p,
See e.g. Blanchard and Fischer (1989).
Exceptions are formed by Judd (1985) and Bovenberg (1989).
Notice that we have extended the model used by Judd (1982) by allowing for a vector of parame-
ters where the value of this vector at time s tnay influence the dynamics of the state variables at
time t for t~s.Z
which is characterized by saddlepoint stability'. Now we are going to analyze the effect of a perturbation of
thc parameter vcctor. L.ct p, - p. yh, (t-o,1,...). That is, thc vcctor h~ denotcs thc time pat[ern of Ihc
perturbation and the scalar y the magnimde, where h~ is assumed to be bounded and eventually constant.
Linearization of systcm (1) around the initial stationary state by differentia[ion with respect to y yields:
ds~.t dx~ ~8?hs.,
dY - J dY :~-r
dYr t dy` ~ gsh:.r d y d y ,-.,
(2)
where J is [hc Jacobian matrix and g; (i-1,2) deno[es the derivative of g' with respec[ to p~,r, both
evaluated in (x,7. If we define X(v) and Y(v) as the discrete-time Laplace transforms' of a~ and aY ar er
respectively, and G'(v) - Er-o~:--r8,h~„v-`-` (i-1,2) we can derive [ha[:
dxo
vX(v) - v-
dy - ~~X(v)~ 4 (vGt(v)1
(3)
It z JI
vY(v) - v ~Yo Y(v) vG (v)
, Y
In order tu de[erminc dY , i.e. the jump in x at t-0 induced by y, a boundary value problem has to be
solved. A set of initial conditions follows from the fact that y is predetermined: áy - 0. A set of final
conditions results from the assumption that éy and áY are bounded, i.e. that the model follows the
saddlepath to the steady state. Given these conditions, the problem can easïly be solved (see Blanchazd and
Kahn (I980)). Here we only derive the solution for the case that the system consists of one predetermined
and one jump variable. Then, solving (3) for the jump in the non-predetermined variable gives:
dxo ~tzht-Uu-v)(lzz-v) ~u-v z t - Y(v) . G (v) - G (v). (4)
dY Íuv ~zt
We now substitute the unstable root p of the linearized system for v. In that case Y(v) is bounded and the
first term on the RHS of eq. (4) is equal to zero which implies thats:
Comparalive dynamics can also be applied when the number of s[able rexxs exceeds the number of
predctcnnincd variables. In Ihat casc it givcs only one of thc infinite numtx:r of possible solutions,
howcver. When the system has tuo many unstable roots there is no bcwndcd solution and
lincariration makcs no sense.
' In general, if f,: R'-R" is a function of exponential order, the discrete-time Laplace transform of
j isdefinedas ~;,of,v-`-F(v): Rt-R". No[icethat vF(v)-vfo-~-0Ír,tv `.
If we compare this discrete-time result with the expression for the jump variable in continuous time
as derivcd by ludd (1982) in his eq. (7), we find that if the dynamical system and Jacobian matrix
are appropriately defined (compare eqs. (4) of Judd (1982) and eq. (2) of this note), the continuous
time and discrete-time expressions for the non-predetermined vaziable only differ in G'(v). In
discrete time G'(v) is defined as E;,AE;a-,g~h~ ~v-`-t while in wntinuous time
G'(v) - 1"0!"- ,g,' hs ,e-"`dsdt (see Judd (1982) p.57). The definition of G'(v) also fortns the only
difference between the expressions for the jump in the evaluation function in a continuous-time




Given d- (and `~Y" - 0), [he complete time path of `~'' and ay' can be traced by applying system (2).
dr dr dr er
Moreover, we can evaluate the induced change in dynamic evaluation functions in terms of x and y using
eq. (3). Suppose e.g. that we are interested in:
uo - ~ w(x,,Y,)( l . B)-`.
~-o
Then the effect of y on uo can be approximated by:
(!~ i - !r)GZ(t-)
du -Gt(p) .Gt(lf B)
o-[w,,Wr][(1.B)f-l1-' Íxt dy
GZ(1 t e)
where w~ and wY indieate the derivatives of w with respect to x and y evaluated in the stationary state.
3. The accuracy of comparative dynamics
(6)
(7)
In this section the accuracy of the method of comparative dynamícs will be illustrated by some examples.
All examples are based on the standard Ramsey-model with a capital tax r'. Production y is described by
the following decreasing retums to scale technology:
y, -Í(k,), (8)
where k is the capital-labor ratio. Consumers mazimize lifetime utility u, which eyuals the Flow of CRRA-
felicities associated with consumption c discounted at the rate of time preference B:
m c~-P
uo - ~ ` ( I t B)-`. (9)
~-0 1 - P
The first-order conditions then result in the following system of non-linear difference equations:
~ 1'(1'r)f~(kr.t)1tt0 (l0a)
c~.t'cr (1tn)(1.0) ll
k~ 'f(ka - c~ ( IOb) k~.t' ltn ~
where n indicates the rate of population growth. Now we are going to analyu the effect of a once and for
all change in the tax rate. That is, we assume that r~ - r t y'. Lineari7ation of system (10) around the
stationary state then gives:
See Blanchard and Fischer (1989) Chapter 2.
Cf. the general eyuation p,-p ~ yh, (t-0,1,..J. Notice that h~ is constant in case of a once-and-
















Notice that this system consists of a jump variable (áT') and a predetetmined variable (ák'). Consequently,
the system is saddlepoint stable if it has one root that lies outside the unit circle (p). Dynamic efficiency
(j'(k) ~ n) is a sufficient condition for this to be true. Following the method of compazative dynamics, the
initial effect of a once-and-for-all change in the tax rate on consumption can be approximated by (cf. eq.
(5)):
dco
- -G~(Ir) - j(k)c .
dy (i(1.B)(ltn)(~-1)
Moreover, the effect on lifetime utility can be approximated by (cf. eq. (7)):
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We cvaluated thc last two formulas for two Icvels of lhe tax rate (r-0 and r-0.5) and threc rates
of rclativc risk aversion ( fi -0.5, p- 1.5 and (i - 10). The results are presented in Tablc 1. We also
computed the change in initial consumption and lifetime consumption rela[ive to the rate of change in the tax
rate ( e`" and e-" ) for these parame[er sets numerically. This was done for three different magni[udes of
e~ er
the change in the tax rate. Table 1 also presents the relative error (e) in the approximation by comparative
dynamics. Of course, in general the accuracy of the approximation depends on the extent of [he change in
the tax rate: the relative error is proportional to the change in r(compare the relative errors in the
columns)v.
Table 1 reveals that the accuracy of the approximation of the jump in initial consumption is almost
independem of the initial level of the tax. This can be concluded from the relative errors e. But the relative
approximation errors e" seem to suggest that this is not true for [he accuracy of the jump in utility. If the
initial tax rate is positive comparative dynamics predicts the actual decrease in utility to a large extent, but
in case of a zero initial tax rate the linear approximation predicts uro percent of the actual effect on uo.
The reason for this is that when r- 0 a marginal increase in the taz rate has no effect on utility. However,
" The reason for this is that for the relatively small values of the change in r considered here the
terms of third and higher order in the Taylor expansion are negligible, while the first-order term is
included in the linear approximation. So, what is left is the second-order [erm, which [urns up as a
lincar function of ~ r in the relative error.5
Table l. The accuracy af comparative dyuamic~
r-0 r-0.s
Parameter Sets -
p-os p-l.s p-lo p-o.s p-ls ~-10




2.0795 1.0607 0.2s62 1.2480 0.5853 0.1170
Or-0.1
e~ 0.0301 O.O139 O.OOl4 0.0304 O.O176 O.O134
numcrical e~o
er
2.0231 1.0473 0.2ss9 1.2138 O.s760 O.IIS6
Or-0.01
simulations e~ 0.0031 O.W14 O.OWI 0.0031 0.0017 0.0013
e`"
er 2.0175 1.0460 0.2559 1.2104 O.s7s1 O.I1s5
A r-0.001
e 0.0003 O.OOOI 0.0000 0.0003 0.0002 0.(100I




-0.6192 -0.2s46 -0.0006 -9.7773 -7.1032 -1.8084
Or-0.1
e~ I I 1 0.1369 O.176s 0.2971
nurnerical ed~
e
-0.0603 -0.0245 -0.0001 -8.s631 -5.9600 - 1.3I20
Ot-0.01 r
simulations
e~ 1 1 l 0.0146 0.018s 0.0312
e-o
e. -O.OObO -0.0024 0.0000 -8.4508 -s.860s -1.27s3
A r-0.001
E 1 1 l 0.001s 0.0019 0.0033
e~, a~, e~ a.o
' It is assumed that n-0.1, 8-0.1 and j(ka-kÓ3. Furthermore, e~- e.ecaé~ ~d E.- é~Q é.
~
é~ n.
this also implies that, starting from r-0, the actual effect of a discrete change in the tax rate is very small,
going to zero if the tax change approaches zero. As a consequence, the approxitnation is as good as in any
other point (see [he absolute errors e~ - a.~)'
The accuracy of the approximation of the jump in co increases when the felici[y function is more
concave (larger (i). This is due to the fact that in that case the effect of a change in consumption on
marginal utility and through that on the rate of change in c, is larger. Therefore, a smaller jump in initial
consumption is required to bring the system on the saddlepath. In the experiments presented here this7'able 2. The accuracy of comparative staticsb
z-0 r-0.s
Parameter Sets -
p-o.s p-1s p-1o p-os p-1s p-1o
comparative "~ -1.2472 -1.2472 -1.2472 -1.8141 -1.8141 -1.8141
statics ar
ec er -1.3039 -1.3039 -1.3039 -1.8707 -1.8707 -1.8707
4 r -0.1




-1.2528 -L 2528 -1.2528 -1.8197 -1.8197 -1.8197
Or-O.OI
simulations é 0.0045 0.0045 0.0045 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031
e-`
er
-1.2477 -L2477 -1.2477 -1.8146 -1.8146 -L8I46
0 z-0.001 é~ O.OOOS O.OOOS 0.0005 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
comparative dy




-10.8472 -6.2068 -0.0550 -2I.0804 -22.1754 -38.707s
Or-0.1




-111.2497 -s.6698 -0.0370 -19.6317 -18.8837 -13.SRG9
Or-O.OI r
simulations ~ 0.0062 0.0097 0.0386 0.007s O.Olbl 0.0876
eu
e.
-IO.1921 -5.6203 -0.0357 -19.4998 -18.6095 -12.5087
A r-0.001 E" 0.0006 0.0010 0.0039 0.0007 0.0016 0.0089
na aa e: e~
"It is assumed [hat n-0.1, 8-0.1 and f(k~)-kos. Furthermore, é~- ei-é. and É"- e. -ér
n~ e"
nr ér
implics, in combination with the strict concavity of the felicity and pmduction functions, that the errur due
to higher-order effects is also smaller. So increasing the non-linearity of a singlc function may in fact
improve the lincar approximation of the model variables. This is the case if the system equations, tha[
determine the dynamics of the model, get more lineaz if the model equations are made less linear. Notice
that the method of comparative dynamics underestimates the change in c for low values of p, but predicts
too largc a jump in case of p- 10. Furthermore, i[ is interesting to notice [hat Ihe increased accuracy of thc
approximation of consumption is not reflected in the accuracy of the approximation of lifetime utility. Thclatter incrcases when (i rises as the decrease in the prediction error in c is outweighed by the increased
concavity of the felicity function.
In order to have a point of reference to judge the accuracy of comparative dynamics, we performed
a comparative-sta[ics analysis for the same pazameter combinations. Comparative statia is a widely used
lineari~ation technique to calculate the steady-state or long-run effects of perturbations on model
outcumcs."' Just as with comparative dynamics, thc outcomes of this analysis were compared to thc
numerical outcomes. The results of this ezperiment are presented in Table 2. Matching the approzimations
in Table l and Table 2 leams that comparative dynamics performs significantly better than comparative
statics in predic[ing the change in consumption, especially for high values of Q. This suggests that the
technique of comparative dynamics performs well according to standards generally accepted by economists.
For the approximation of lifetime utility, the results of comparative dynamics are not always as good as
those of comparative statics. This can be inferred from the case where the initial tax rate is set at r- 0.5
(the outcomes for the case of a zero initial tax rate cannot be compared in a meaningful way). For relatively
low values of (i comparative statics performs better than comparative dynamics, while comparativc
dynamics beats comparativc statics for relatively high (i's. In all cases, however, the inaccuracy ol
comparative dynamics is not very large in comparison with the standardly used method of comparative
statics, justifying the use of comparative dynamics to analyze the short-tun effects of parameter changes.
We have also performed experiments for the continuous-time version of the Ramsey model. The
numerical outcomes of these exercises were virtually identical to the ones obtained for the discrete-timc
model. So also li~r continuous-time modets the method of comparative dynamics seems to generate prccisc
cnough results.
A major benefit of the method of comparative dynamics is that i[ makes the effects of non-
stationary shocks tractable. Even if the time pattern of the shock is so complicated that it is impossible to
draw a phase diagram to illustrate its effects, the method of comparative dynamics can be applied rather
easily. The timing of the parameter change leaves all elements of the comparative-dynamics analysis
unaffectcd, apart from [he C'(v)'s. Let us illus[ratc this with the Ramsey-modcl we used before. Assumc
for instance that r, - r t yh,, where h~ - t4t~-`"[ with y~,~ ~ 0 is a hump-shaped (unction. Summing this
function yields the discrete-time Laplace transform N(v) - F.ó wt(~ t v) ` t- yr(~. v)"Z. That can be used to
calculate G t(v) --,V(d' ~v)-2 R f'(k) and GZ(v) -0. Inserting this in eqs. (5) and (7) together with the
Jacobian of ey. ( I t) and the first vector of the RHS of eq. (13) gives the comparative-dynamics
approximations of the jumps in consumption and utility. The accuracy of these outcomes is influenced by
two (actors: the total discounted value of the change in the tax rate, which of course negatively influences
accuracy, and thc time paucrn of thc shock. The simulation experiments we performed showed that if thc
lax rate change is more unevcnly distributed, i.e. if the h~-function ge[s more 'humped', the comparativc-
dynamics approximations of the jumps in consumption and utility become less precise. In other words, the
increase in the linearization error emanating from the time intervals where the change in the tax rate is
larger dominates the decrease in the linearization error caused by the smaller change in the taz rate in other
'o For a discussion of the method and accuracy of comparative statics, see Bovenberg and Keller
(1984).s
time intervals. This is an inmitive result as the strictly concave nature of Ihe felicity and production function
suggests that higher-order effects increase more than proportionally with the size of the shock.
4. Conclusions
The method of comparative dynamics is a useful tool to analyze the effects of shocks in dynamic perfect
(oresight models in discrete and in continuous time. Numerical simulation experiments learn that, in [he case
of the Ramsey-model, it is as accurate as comparative statics which is a widely accepted technique. As a
lar}c part uf miKlcrn macro cconnmic thcory is closcly rclatcd to thc Ramscy-m~xlcl, this resuh may bc
gcneralizcd to many of the dynamic pcrfcct-foresight models economists use today. 'I'hcrefure, comparativc
dynamics dcscrvcs a placc in cvery economist's tool box. Onc should, however, always kcep in mind that it
is based on linear approximation, which implies that its accuracy tends to decrease if larger or more
unevenly distributed parameter changes are studied, or if the non-linearity of the system is increased. On the
other hand, it should be noticed that, as shown in simulation experiments, increasing non-linearity of a
single function may in fact make the system more linear and thus raise the accuracy of the approximation.
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